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The pivot to Asia policy from the Obama administration to the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act signed into law by the Trump administration signals the importance of 
sustaining the U.S. influence in Asia.  While the policy and the law broadly refer to Asia, 
the embodiment of those enactments emphasizes keeping a check on China’s influence in 
Asia.  The U.S. foreign policy in East Asia relies on cooperation from many of its allies 
in the region and South Korea and Japan are arguably the two biggest allies in the East 
Asia region.  Without support from the two nations, the U.S. cannot effectively control 
limiting China’s dominance in the region.  This thesis attempts to shed a light on issues 
that placed distrust between South Korea and Japan and argue that the U.S. must 
intervene and mediate to overcome the issues in order for the U.S.-South Korea-Japan 
trilateral relationship to be successful.  The issue of “Comfort Women” and the dispute 
surrounding the Liancourt Rocks have deteriorated the South Korea-Japan bilateral 
relationship.  By examining the deployment of the latest missile defense system created 
by the U.S. and the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation treaty, this thesis will convey the 
importance of building up the trilateral relationship given the rise of China for the benefit 
of advancing U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.  The “Comfort Women” and the Liancourt 
Rocks dispute remaining unresolved, the U.S. will face difficult challenges to rally 
undivided cooperation from South Korea and Japan. 
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The U.S. foreign policy in the period of the Obama administration shifted from 
focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan to Asia, a strategy that precipitated many scholars to 
study the “pivot” to Asia.  President Obama urged Congress to fast-track a free-trade deal 
with Asia before China “vacuums” the region economically, asserting “(i)f we don’t 
write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region.”1  President Obama further 
commented that, “(w)e want China to be successful.  We want China to continue to 
embark on its peaceful rise…we just want to make sure that the rules of the road allow us 
to compete and everybody else to compete.  We don’t want China to use its size to 
muscle other countries in the region around rules that disadvantage us.”2  America has 
arguably flexed its muscle in the international arena for decades militarily, economically, 
and politically after World War II and following the fall of the Soviet Union.  President 
Obama badgered Congress to act fast, hinting the urgency to constrain China’s influence 
in Asia.  Asia is indeed one of the most important regions in the world for America, 
considering many allies in the region partnered strategically to secure the own interests of 
each nation, but plausibly in ways and means determined best-fit for the interest of 
America. 
In “The Case of the Pivot to Asia: System Effects and the Origins of strategy,” 
Nicholas Anderson and Victor Cha state that President Obama’s view on the pivot to 
Asia consisted of, “U.S. commitment to security, prosperity, and human rights in the 
 
1 Gerald F. Seib, “Obama Presses Case for Asia Trade Deal, Warns Failure Would Benefit China,” The 
Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, April 27, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-




Asia-Pacific”3  and that the pivot to Asia was a “midcourse correction to an early Obama 
administration Asia policy consisting of surprise, mistakes, and inattention.”4  In their 
view, the pivot to Asia was not an established foreign policy strategy from the inception 
of the Obama administration, but a reaction to better respond to changes in the Asia 
region.  President Obama’s commitment to security, prosperity, and human rights was 
implemented by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s diplomatic strategy in the Asia 
region.  Clinton’s strategy included strengthening U.S. bilateral security alliance with 
Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, deepening relationship with 
India, Indonesia, and China, engaging in multilateral institutions in Asia such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
expanding free-trade agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and advancing human 
rights and democracy in places such as Burma, North Korea, and Vietnam.5  The Obama 
administration emboldened allies in the region in a form of military alliance and 
economic trade while pressuring those nations under the communist influence.  As 
Anderson and Cha argue, the pivot to Asia strategy is a reaction to “surprise, mistakes, 
and inattention”6 and when examining the economic and military alliance in the region, 
the surprise, mistakes, and inattention refer to China.  China’s emerging appearance in 
the world arena to challenge the influence of the U.S. surprised the Obama 
administration, and responses to counter the influence resulted in mistakes, and 
 
3 Anderson, Nicholas D., and Victor D. Cha. 2017. “The Case of the Pivot to Asia: System Effects and the 
Origins of Strategy.” Political Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 132 (4): p. 598. 
4 Ibid. p. 616. 
5 Ibid. p. 598. 
6 Ibid. p. 616 
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inattention to detail on how China influenced the East Asia region culminated the 
administration to reshape the Asia foreign policy to what we know now as pivot to Asia.  
In December 2018, President Trump signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
2018 (ARIA) into law, which states,  
(w)ithout strong leadership from the United States, the international system, 
fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United 
States, regional, and global interest. It is imperative that the United States 
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by – (A) defending 
peace and security; (B) advancing economic prosperity; and (C) promoting 
respect for fundamental human rights.7 
 
ARIA references pivot to Asia strategy implemented by the Obama 
administration and signals the importance of exercising continuous influence in the Asia 
region.  The continuation of the pivot to Asia strategy in a form of law with dedicated 
funding bespeaks the reality of emerging threat as China continues to rise against the 
United States to claim its leadership role in the Asia region.  Section 2 of the law 
specifies findings that the “core tenets of the United States-backed international system 
are being challenged, including by (A) China’s illegal construction and militarization of 
artificial features in the South China Sea and coercive economic practices…”8  The 
findings continue with testimony from Professor Douglas Dillon at the Harvard 
University to the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity 
Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate hearing that,  
(a)s realistic students of history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the United 
States has played since World War II as the architect and underwriter of regional 
stability and security has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself.  
But they believe that as the tide that brought the United States to Asia recedes, 
America must leave with it.  Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere 
 




faded at the beginning of the twentieth century, so must America’s role in Asia as 
the region’s historic superpower resumes its place.9 
 
For the Congress to include professor Dillion’s testimony in the findings section of the 
law is confounding, reassuring with the promulgation of the law that as much as the 
Chinese leaders would like to see the United States fade as Britain’s did, the Unites States 
will not recede from the region.  Senator Gardner, one of the main sponsor of the ARIA 
stated that, “(f)or decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s 
rise and for its integration into the postwar international world order would liberalize 
China…contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the 
sovereignty of others.”10  The intent of the law, and the actual drafted language of the law 
all points to China, that the pivot to Asia is no longer a foreign policy agenda that could 
change from administrations to administrations, but a promulgated law with funding of 
$1.5 billion to secure the U.S. influence in the region.   
 From the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia policy to the Trump 
administration’s ARIA, strengthening the trilateral relationship between United States, 
South Korea, and Japan is emphasized to a degree that the law mandates the incumbent 
administration to develop a strategy “to deepen trilateral security cooperation between the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea.”11  The success of maintaining a good tri-lateral 
relationship depends on the relationship between South Korea and Japan, given that the 
bilateral relationship between the U.S and South Korea, and the U.S. and Japan is 
relatively stable in favor of the U.S. given the U.S’s upper-hand position.   
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Rachel Oswald. “Senate Eyes Passage of Bill to Check China in Asia-Pacific.” Roll Call, 2 Oct. 2018, 
www.rollcall.com/2018/10/02/senate-eyes-passage-of-bill-to-check-china-in-asia-pacific/. 
11 Public Law No: 115-409 
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South Korea and Japan have a long history of thorny issues and the United States 
has remained rather neutral on those issues.  Without cooperation from South Korea and 
Japan in a unified direction steered by the U.S, the U.S. will face difficult challenges in 
exercising its influence in the East Asia region.  The underlying issues between South 
Korea and Japan are largely on two fronts, the issue of “Comfort Women,” and the 
territorial dispute surrounding the Liancourt Rocks. This paper will examine the 
aforementioned underlying issues and argue that while the United States could continue 
to remain silent on the matters between South Korea and Japan, it should be in the 
interest of the United States to intervene and mitigate vigorously to maximize its 
influence in the East Asia region.   
First, the paper will discuss the U.S.-deployed missile defense system in South 
Korea and its effect on the South Korea-China relationship.  The U.S.-deployed missile 
defense system is a great example to reveal the complicated situation surrounding the 
importance of the Korean peninsula geopolitically to the United States.  The United 
States has stationed troops in South Korea since the Korean War and the sophisticated 
technology of the missile defense system has reached an unparalleled level, far strong 
enough to deter any rogue nations to deploy missiles targeted at the U.S. troops stationed 
in South Korea or any corner of the South Korean soil.  Albeit the defense system 
nonetheless provides a layer of security to South Korea and nearby allies, the system also 
placed the government of South Korea in a burdensome situation with China.  China 
demanded the government of South Korea to not allow the U.S. to deploy the missile 
defense system mainly due to a concern over the usage of the radar accompanying the 
system, claiming that the justification of protecting U.S. allies is a cover-up and the real 
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reason behind is to surveillance and deter China.  While discussing the U.S.-deployed 
missile defense system in South Korea, the paper will also examine the Japan-U.S. 
Defense Cooperation treaty. The United States should ensure that the treaty explicitly 
does not allow the Japanese troops on South Korean soil in the event of a war on the 
Korean peninsula.  The notion of the Japanese troops present in South Korea, regardless 
of the reason, would be a disturbing scene given the Japanese annexation of the Korean 
peninsula in 1910.  South Koreans to this day demand justice from Japan on what they 
claim as wrongdoings during Japanese colonialization.  In October 2018, the Supreme 
Court of South Korea ordered the Nippon Steel Corporation of Japan and Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries of Japan to compensate South Korean workers who were forced to work 
in its factories during the colonialization.  The government of Japan retaliated by 
implementing tightening regulations on trade by removing South Korea from its trade 
whitelist, which fueled the government of South Korea to reconsider extending the 
General Security of Military Information Agreement.12  The scar from Japanese 
colonialization is still living amongst South Koreans, which directs this paper to the next 
topic. 
Second, this paper will discuss the issue of “Comfort Women” and convey that 
the U.S. should not remain silent on the issue for the interest of the U.S’s influence in the 
East Asia region.  Despite several agreements reached by both the South Korean and 
Japanese government, the issue of “Comfort Women” remains unresolved.  The 
 
12 Kathryn Botto. “Overcoming Obstacles to Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Interoperability- Korea Net 
Assessment 2020: Politicized Security and Unchanging Strategic Realities.” Carnegie Endowment for 





government of South Korea’s demand for sincere apology whereas the government of 
Japan claims that Japan has done everything demanded by the South Korean government.  
The difference in the perception of what is considered as a sincere apology exacerbated 
the issue of “Comfort Women” into a nearly three-decade-long unresolved issue.   
 Lastly, this paper will discuss the territorial dispute surrounding the Liancourt 
Rocks and also convey that the U.S. should mitigate this matter by persuading both 
nations to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to put an end to the 
dispute.  Similar to the issue of “Comfort Women,” the territorial dispute surrounding the 
Liancourt Rocks is rooted in the Japanese colonialization.  The government of South 
Korea claims the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks based on its historical documents 
dating pre-Japanese colonialization, whereas the government of Japan claims the 
sovereignty based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.  The territorial dispute 
could be resolved by the ICJ if both governments would agree to have the court hear the 
case.  Unlike Japan, which advocates for the ICJ hearing, South Korea is hesitant to 
submit the case to the ICJ since the submission itself could be portrayed as doubting its 
sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks.   
The United States must find a way to achieve a cohesive relationship between 
South Korea and Japan in order to exert influence and respond rapidly to changes in East 
Asia.  Although the thorny issues from the past should be dealt with independently when 
discussing achievements of economic prosperity and military stability, the reality is that 
these thorny issues will arise to surface over and over, limiting the advancement of U.S.-





Chapter 1 – Significance of missile defense system and Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation 
The United States gained its upper hand of being the world’s superpower 
following the fall of the Soviets and since then, carries on arduous missions to secure 
peace in the world.  Henry Luce observes in “The American Century” that, “(A)merica 
cannot be responsible for the good behavior of the entire world.  But America is 
responsible, to herself as well as to history, for the world environment in which she 
lives.”13  America has for decades expanded its “empire” by inviting nations to join the 
superpower and promised assurances from enemies.  In order to fulfill the mission to 
protect allies from perceivable threats of rogue nations, U.S. armed forces reached the 
level of unparalleled strength and technological advances, including the exceptional 
sophistication of Missile Defense intensified under President Reagan.   
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) program in a television address broadcast nationally, 
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not 
rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we 
could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our 
own soil or that of our allies?...I call upon the scientific community in our 
country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the 
cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these 
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.14 
 
The SDI served several interests for President Reagan.  The successful 
development of the SDI would pose President Reagan as “a man of vision who would 
 
13 Henry Robinson Luce, The American Century (New York, NY: Time, Inc., 1941). p. 166. 




end the threat of missile attacks and ensure that the populations of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and indeed, the world would survive.”15  The natural borders protecting 
America from enemies, the Pacific, and the Atlantic Ocean, also means that enemies 
would have to deploy missiles with a greater range capability to target the American 
homeland, such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).  Soviets at the time focused 
its resources on developing ICBMs that, “if it [SDI] worked, Americans would gain the 
upper hand on the Soviets, whose superpower status was based in large measure on their 
arsenal of ICBM.  The proposed missile shield threatened the value of this Soviet 
investment and Moscow’s claims to equality with the United States.”16  The SDI would 
not only protect the homeland but also deter Soviet from proliferating arsenals since no 
missiles will ever reach America.  
Despite the great advantages of the SDI, critics of the SDI pointed that a 
defensive system sophisticated as the SDI would be enormously expensive, and “would 
accelerate the arms race – it would have to work perfectly the first time it was needed, 
and it would tempt a Soviet first strike if the Soviets felt they were on the verge of 
becoming “nuclear hostages” to the unassailable United States.”17  The deterrence 
strategy of SDI, to nullify the first attack which makes America unassailable, could 
trigger the Soviets to “attack anyways” and carry the weight of inevitable war.  Critics 
were wrong about the first attack by Soviets, yet correct that the SDI was in fact 
enormously expensive and triggered an arms race as the history reveals. 
 
15 Steven W. Hook and John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II, 18th ed. (Los 
Angeles, CA: SAG/CQ Press, 2019). p. 138. 




President Reagan’s vision for SDI has created The Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization in 1984, which is now called The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
delivering mission to “develop and deploy a layered ballistic missile defense system to 
defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile 
attacks of all ranges in all phases of flight”.18  The missile defense mechanism is to 
demonstrate nations’ maturity of sophistication in technology, stable and robust economy 
able to fund related researches and productions, and to promise safeguards of allies.  
Intercepting a missile – moving at a speed of hundreds of miles per hour, from thousands 
of miles in the air requires topnotch technology and unlimited funding sources to 
repeatedly test products, and America has proved over the years its exceptional leading 
position in the field of missile defense with the newest system called Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).  In layman’s term, the THAAD system is, “…just 
basically a solid warhead.  They [MDA] call it a kinetic warhead, or a kinetic munition.  
So rather than exploding it simply strikes its target.”19   
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 sparked the importance of enhancing the missile 
defense system.  A Scud missile launched by the Iraqi killed 27 and wounded 98 
American soldiers and the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) -2 was the Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) system utilized at the time of the Persian Gulf War. 20  However, 
 
18 "MISSILE DEFENSE: The First Seventy Years." Missile Defense Agency. 
https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/first70.pdf 
19 “How Good Is the New Missile Defense System the US Just Deployed in South Korea?,” The World 
from PRX, accessed March 11, 2020, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-
defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea. 
20 R. W. Apple, “WAR IN THE GULF: Scud Attack; Scud Missile Hits a U.S. Barracks, Killing 27,” The 





the nine percent success rate of PAC-2’s intercepting and destroying Scud missiles urged 
Congress to demand the Department of Defense to build a more effective BMD system.21 
The THAAD is an American ballistic missile defense system that enhances the 
mission of the MDA given its “unique endo & exo capability [that] adds an essential 
layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements 
existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only 
PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD).”22  The endo refers to 
mostly short-ranged missiles that stay within the earth atmosphere during its trajectory 
whereas exo refers to mostly long-ranged missiles that leave the earth atmosphere, 
principally denoting THAAD’s capability to intercept short and long raged missiles. 
Nations utilizing the missile defense system cannot rely solely on a single system.  The 
layered component of the missile defense system enhances options when it comes to 
intercepting a missile, and the THAAD fills in the gap where the PAC-3 and the Aegis 
BMD may not reach. 
The U.S. repeatedly proposed to install THAAD in South Korea to ensure 
maximum safety against any unforeseeable acts by North Korea.  The first mentioning of 
THAAD dates to 2008 during a nomination hearing of United States Force Korea 
(USFK) Commander General Walter Sharp. General Sharp stated that THAAD would 
provide “provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability required to protect 
critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea”23 In 2011, General James 
 
21 Park, Hwee Rhak. “The Ballistic Missile Defense Construction Strategies of South Korea and Japan: 
Self-Reliance versus Cooperation with the US.” p. 89 
22 Harry J. Kazianis Dan Sauter, “THAAD: America's Super Shield against Ballistic Missiles?,” The 
National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, March 6, 2017), 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/thaad-americas-super-shield-against-ballistic-missiles-11701. 
23 Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (2008, May 22). Second session, 110th 
congress. Retrieved from U.S. Government Publishing Office 
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Thurman stated similar opinion on THAAD during his hearing of USFK Commander, 
stating, 
the system that would best support the layered defense employment principle is a 
THAAD system which can engage inbound TBMs at either the terminal or mid-
course phase of flight. A THAAD system could be used to provide layered 
defense and also improve early warning for the Korean Peninsula as well as 
enhance Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) early warning in the region.24 
 
Despite South Korea having its own ballistic missile defense system, called the Korea Air 
and Missile Defense (KAMD), the USFK commanders insisted on installing THAAD in 
South Korea to protect critical U.S. facilities by enhancing KAMD’s capability.25   
North Korea’s successful test of the Unha-3 from the Sohae facility in December 
2012, putting a satellite in orbit shifted the pendulum of installing THAAD from a “nice-
to-have” to deterrence against a possible nuclear threat.  The implication of North 
Korea’s technological capability to launch its satellite in orbit from its launching station 
poses a great threat to the security of U.S. and allies, including South Korea and Japan 
since, “(w)hile North Korea referred to its rocket as a space launch vehicle, the 
technology was very similar to that of a long-range missile.  With minor changes to allow 
for re-entry, Pyongyang could deliver a WMD payload.”26  USA Today reports that, 
“Nuclear experts in China have revealed that North Korea may already have 20 nuclear 
 
24 Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan L. Fearey, “Missile Defense and Strategic Stability: Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea,” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3 (June 2017): 
pp. 321-344, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1280744. p. 325 
25 Ibid. 




warheads and could double that arsenal by next year… the total exceeds current U.S. 
assessments of the secretive state's nuclear weapons.”27   
The 2019 Missile Defense Review was published in February 2019 following 
President Trump ordering the Department of Defense in May 2017 that, “The Secretary 
shall initiate a new Ballistic Missile Defense Review to identify ways of strengthening 
missile defense capabilities, rebalancing homeland and theater defense priorities, and 
highlighting priority funding areas.”28  The review, “describes the policies, strategies, and 
capabilities that will guide the Department of Defense (DoD) missile defense programs to 
counter the expanding missile threats posed by rogue states and revisionist powers to us, 
our allies, and partners, including ballistic and cruise missiles, and hypersonic 
vehicles.”29 The report further discusses North Korea’s capability to launch an attack, 
(w)hile a possible new avenue to peace now exists with North Korea, it continues 
to pose an extraordinary threat and the United States must remain vigilant. In the 
past, North Korea frequently issued explicit nuclear missile threats against the 
United States and allies, all the while working aggressively to field the capability 
to strike the U.S. homeland with nucleararmed ballistic missiles. Over the past 
decade, it has invested considerable resources in its nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs, and undertaken extensive nuclear and missile testing in order to realize 
the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with missile attack. As a result, North 
Korea has neared the time when it could credibly do so.30 
 
Security measures of any nations should examine the worst pragmatic scenario and 
prepare its priorities based on what could happen, and although the likelihood of North 
 
27 Calum MacLeod, “North Korea Expands Nuclear Arsenal, Chinese Experts Say,” USA Today (Gannett 
Satellite Information Network, April 23, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/23/north-
korea-nuclear-weapons-increased-estimate/26226981/. 
28 “Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces,” The White House (The United States 
Government), accessed June 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-rebuilding-u-s-armed-forces/. 





Korea carrying out a nuclear attack on South Korea is minimal, the unclassified materials 
that are available to the public are sufficient to acknowledge that North Korea possesses 
actual threat, and its trembling leadership and unclear diplomatic channels make it 
difficult for the world to calculate the possibility of the worst-case scenario.  As the 2019 
Missile Defense Review suggests, although there has been a momentum of peace 
between North Korea and the United States, vigilant security measures should remain 
until peace is reached.   
 Nonetheless, different opinions existed in South Korea mainly between the 
department of defense and the ministry of foreign affairs.  The department of defense 
urged the administration to finalize the deal to deploy THAAD to enhance the defense 
mechanism, whereas the ministry of foreign affairs worried about potential drawbacks in 
the diplomatic relationship with China.  The South Korea administration remained silent 
on the matter, acknowledged the importance of both departments yet maintained its 
strategic ambiguity.  The Diplomat reported on this issue that,  
(f)rom China’s perspective, THAAD represents a considerable threat to Chinese 
ballistic missiles which would theoretically come into play in a nuclear weapon 
use scenario. From a Chinese perspective, a U.S.-allied state operating a highly 
advanced anti-ballistic missile system, even if not directed explicitly at China, is 
an unacceptable security risk”31   
 
In order for the Missile Defense Agency to detect incoming missile threats and launch 
counter, it requires extensive and exquisite radars in geographically salient locations that 
could increase the capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense mechanism to intercept 
incoming missiles at various phases.  Deploying THAAD in South Korea means that it 
requires a U.S. X-Band radar to accompany the THAAD system, which would have the 
 
31 Ankit Panda, “South Korea, China Trade Barbs Over THAAD,” – The Diplomat (for The Diplomat, 
March 18, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/south-korea-china-trade-barbs-over-thaad/. 
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scanning radius far enough to cover North Korea that would scan parts of China as well, 
allowing the U.S. the ability to detect and intercept Chinese missiles.32 
 The missile defense experts, however, expressed univocal opinions on China’s 
claim that the THAAD will have no business in China unless China launches a missile 
towards South Korea.  Bruce Klinger, a Senior Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage 
Foundation and former CIA Deputy Division Chief for Korean analysis, argued, “the 
THAAD interceptors are designed to attack missiles heading toward the interceptors in 
the terminal inbound phase, not missiles flying away in the boost and mid-range phases 
of an outbound ICBM.”33  Given the limited angle of the X-Band radar’s capability, the 
THAAD can only be launched based on the information transferred from radars, which 
lacks the scanning ability of missiles not coming towards the initial launching site of 
THAAD. China should not worry about the U.S. intercepting its missiles unless it is 
heading towards South Korea, which means that the missile could be aimed at Japan or 
other nations to the southeast.  Angelo Codevilla, a former top Senate Intelligence 
Committee official and professor emeritus of International Relations at Boston University 
also argued that given the geographical size of China, intercepting a Chinese ballistic 
missile would require space-based systems that could detect on the very instance of its 
launch, however, given the current treaty banning such development of the system, China 
should not worry about the THAAD accompanied radar surveilling their territory.34   
 
32 Amanda Macias, “Here's How The World's Most Advanced Missile Defense System Works,” Business 
Insider, January 17, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.in/Heres-How-The-Worlds-Most-Advanced-
Missile-Defense-System-Works/articleshow/45927211.cms. 
33 Bruce Klinger, "Why South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The International Relations and 
Security Network, April 21, 2015, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-klingner-why-south-
korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.pdf 
34 Doug Tsuruoka, “Q&A With Angelo Codevilla: US Can Shoot down North Korea's Missiles - but China 




The U.S. will have much to gain whether South Korea decides to deploy THAAD 
or not.  If deployed, the U.S. could deter China’s military strength by effectively closing 
its capability to launch missiles to the southeast of China and completely terminating 
North Korea’s ability to launch any missiles at South Korea.  If South Korea rejects, then 
the U.S. could condemn the administration diplomatically for exposing the nation to an 
obvious risk of a nuclear threat despite the U.S.’s dedication to protecting South Korea 
from North Korea.  An op-ed piece from Global Times China interestingly noted the 
“choosing side” scenario that,  
(t)he US is not happy to see China and South Korea enjoying improvised political 
and security relations in recent years, but it have no justified reason to voice 
opposition and even have to mouth some ostensible support.  However, as 
Washington always seeks to deter North Korea with the US-South Korea alliance 
and counter China, better China-South Korea ties will undermine the cornerstone 
of the US rebalancing strategy and it has to take some countermeasures.  The 
deployment of the THAAD system is a smart tactic that can kill more than two 
birds with just one stone if Seoul eventually agrees.35  
 
Albeit the op-ed piece resonates bias cynical nuance, the author revealed complicated 
political ties between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and whether the U.S. can tailor its 
foreign policy prudently in the region to prevent exacerbation of diplomatic ties. 
 On July 7, 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense released a report stating that, 
“the ROK and the United States made an alliance decision to deploy THAAD to USFK 
as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the ROK and its people, and to protect 
alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
 




missile threats.”36  Considering the contentious nature of the THAAD, the report 
continues, stating,  
(w)hen the THAAD system is deployed to the Korean Peninsula, it will be 
focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be 
directed towards any third-party nations.  The THAAD deployment will 
contribute to a layered missile defense that will enhance the alliance’s existing 
missile defense capabilities against North Korean missile threats.37  
 
The report’s emphasis on THAAD’s main purpose to defend the allies of the U.S. 
bespeaks underlining political tensions surrounding the missile defense system. 
Shortly after the decision was announced, China demarched the U.S. and South 
Korean ambassadors to China to express its disapproval.38  China quickly responded to 
South Korea’s deployment decision in the form of economic retaliation. South Korean 
goods and services including tourism, entertainment, and consumer products were 
restricted and the reported loss in 2017 exceeded $7.5 billion.39  The China National 
Tourism Administration issued travel warnings to discourage trips to South Korea and 
provided instructions to travel agencies to cancel all tours or to face fines or license 
revocation.40  The Korean media contents stopped receiving approvals to release in 
China, visa applications were denied for actors and singers scheduled to perform, and 
Korean video game companies were unable to release new games.41  Professor Han from 
Yonsei University well summarized economic retaliation that, 
(t)he Lotte Corporation, a conglomerate with significant retail operations, became 
a symbolic target of Chinese economic retaliation. The Chinese decided to 
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retaliate against Lotte in particular because the Lotte group allowed one of its golf 
courses to become a host location for THAAD, in exchange for military-owned 
land. The Chinese authorities launched a punitive investigation of Lotte retail 
operations in various Chinese urban centers, including Shanghai, Beijing, 
Shenyang, and Chengdu. By May 2017, Lotte Mart reported that 74 out of its 99 
stores had been forced to shut down following “fire inspections,” while 13 had 
closed temporarily in the face of anti-Korea protests.42 
 
In addition to store closures, the Chinese government banned the construction of multi 
complexes throughout major Chinese cities and the restriction on tourism led to a 
decrease of Chinese visitors to an amusement park in Seoul owned by Lotte.43 
The Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET), the Beijing Office of the 
Korean Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI) and the China Chamber of Commerce 
in Korea surveyed Korean companies in China in the third quarter of 2017 asking a 
question, “Do you feel the negative impact of worsening Sino-ROK relations?”  83.4% of 
survey respondents answered that they felt the negative impact of worsening Sino-ROK 
relations.44  The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted the South 
Korea’s trade dependence on China, placing South Korea in a vulnerable position to 
economic retaliation, stating that, “(i)n 2016, South Korean exports to China reached 
$124 billion, nearly twice as much as exports to the United States, South Korea’s second-
biggest export market.”45  South Korea’s export-dependent economic nature suffered 
egregiously from China’s economic retaliation, and the ordinary South Korean citizens 
who lost jobs and wages are undoubtedly the biggest victim. 
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 The decision to deploy the THAAD in Seongju county, located approximately 
135 miles to the south of Seoul prompted heavy setback from the citizens of Seongju.  
Seongju is located in the middle of South Korea, providing protection for southern cities 
such as Busan, Ulsan, and Pohang – cities with ports, nuclear plants, and oil facilities 
where the U.S. Armed Forces would enter South Korea in the event of an attack.46  The 
Seoungju citizens protested against the deployment of THAAD on a former golf course 
in the Soseong-ri, a town in the Seongju county, citing their concern over the increased 
U.S. military activity in the area and possible environmental pollution from the radiation 
emitted by the X-band radar.  Reuters reported, “around 8000 South Korean police 
gathered in the village of Soseong-ri, along the only road that leads up to the golf course, 
to break up a blockade of around 300 villagers and civic groups opposed to THAAD.”47  
The government of Korea to deploy 8000 police officers to secure the THAAD site from 
protesters is a great example of a contentious matter surrounding the THAAD 
deployment in South Korea.   
The location being Seongju raises concern over whether the THAAD could truly 
defend South Korea from North Korean missiles.  The Asia-Pacific Journal cited a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology weapons physicist that, “the system [THAAD] 
will not work to defend South Korea from North Korea.  Not only is the capital city of 
Seoul, located just thirty miles from the North Korean border, excluded from THAAD’s 
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defense area, but North Korea could also easily trick interceptors by using decoys.”48  
Considering the proximity of Seoul to North Korea, the purpose of the THAAD system is 
to deter North Korea from striking first and to defend U.S.’s strategic military locations 
in the southern parts of South Korea in an event of a missile attack. 
While the government of South Korea was placed in the middle of China and the 
U.S’s tug of war, the United States strengthened its military alliance with Japan which 
could transpire anti-Americanism in South Korea if not tailored carefully.  
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe remarked on diplomatic issues during the 
speech in English to Congress where both Senate and Congress members were present in 
April 2015.  He stated his apologies on behalf of former Japanese leaders for his nation’s 
World War II abuse and expressed his eternal condolences for American lives lost during 
the war,49 further proposing that Tokyo is “resolved to take yet more responsibility for 
the peace and stability in the world.”50  Abe and his administrations’ tenacious ambition 
to strengthen Japan’s military power, considered chimerical given the constitutional 
constraints as expressed in Article 9,  
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of 
the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, 
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will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized,”51  
 
has finally seen the light under the justification to be responsible for peace and stability in 
the world, a distinctive task carried on by the U.S. for decades.  
One day prior to delivering the speech, U.S. and Japan drafted new guidelines for 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation that will supplement the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.  The 
guidelines aim to “ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from 
peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-
Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will 
emphasize…”52 As stated, the guidelines implicate on matters beyond Japan’s domestic 
boundaries, that Japan and the U.S. will cooperatively promote security beyond the Asia-
Pacific region.   
There are three important sections of guidelines that allude to the possible 
offensive capability of Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF), the Actions in Response to an 
Armed Attack against Japan, Operations to Counter Ground Attacks, and Actions in 
Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan.   
The Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan summarizes that 
Japan and U.S. will seek diplomatic and necessary channels to prevent the attack, but if 
occurs, U.S. will “employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, 
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and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required”53 and Japan will focus on 
defending its citizen and territory,   
The Operations to Counter Ground Attacks is interesting to note, stating, 
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct 
bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, 
maritime, or amphibious forces.  The Self-Defense Forces will have primary 
responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, 
including those against islands.  If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will 
conduct operations to retake an island.54 
 
The SDF did not have the authority to prevent and repel ground attacks including those 
against islands in the 1960’s draft.  This statement was added possibly based on the 
request from Japan to counter China’s force around the Senkaku Islands, where China 
and Japan are claiming for its territorial ownership.  Hypothetically, if conflicts between 
China and Japan were to erupt over the islands, Japan will defend to retake the islands 
and U.S. Armed Forces will back-up Japan.  In essence, the new security guidelines serve 
as a threat to China’s attempt to claim the Senkaku Islands, implied in the Operations to 
Counter Ground Attacks section of the treaty. 
 The Operations to Counter Ground Attacks states, “the Self-Defense Forces will 
have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks 
including those against islands.  If the need arises, the Self-Defense Force will conduct 
operations to retake an island.”55  The phrase “retake an island” is used only once in the 
treaty in this section, which again prepares against China’s activity surrounding the 
Senkaku Islands considering a possible threat against the main islands of Japan is hard to 







The Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan 
addresses, “…to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, 
and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the 
armed attack and to deter further attacks.”56  The implication of this guideline remains 
contentious given the lack of clarity of how far could Japan go with the SDF under the 
umbrella of “cooperating with the U.S.” since “(t)he Alliance will respond to situations 
that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations 
cannot be defined geographically.”57  Mike Mochizuki, the Associate Dean of Academic 
Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School in International Affairs has 
commented on this matter stating,  
Permitting the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, however, could 
theoretically allow Japan to be fully integrated with the U.S. military regarding 
the use of force—even in scenarios and geographic areas that do not directly 
threaten the Japanese homeland and nationals, as long as they pose clear threats to 
the United States (such as Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks).58   
 
The new guidelines relieve burdens off of the U.S’s war against terrorists and other 
global “crusade” missions that in the absence of NATO, UN, or other nations reluctant to 
help, the U.S. could count on Japan’s cooperation to carry on global tasks.  Although the 
military budgets are only one of the scales to assess nation’s military power, the trend of 
U.S. military budget decrease in past years since 201059 could have stimulated the new 
Defense Cooperation treaty as a way to penetrate the needs for both nations – the U.S. to 
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time when Japan’s security role and horizons are broadening, when the region is 
undergoing a profound power shift, and when the future of the Korean peninsula is more 
uncertain than ever, the task of reconciliation has become more urgent—not only for 
moral and educational reasons but also for strategic ones.”60  Japan’s relationship with 
Southeast Asian nations, particularly regarding policies on maritime security measures 
since 2012 indicates a common security objective, which is to guard and prepare against 
China’s military influence in the region,61 and the Japan-U.S. guidelines pursued by the 
Japanese administration adequately mitigated pressure off of Japan.  Japan’s leading role 
to achieve newly drafted guidelines operates Japan as the beacon in the region, 
establishing a firm alliance between Japan and Southeast Asian nations that might not 
have established a trustworthy relationship with the U.S. yet.  
 Perhaps the notion of China becoming the next superpower following the fall of 
the Soviets in the 20th century was chimerical, nonetheless, it is undeniable in our time 
that China has become indeed one of the world’s superpowers and is threatening U.S’s 
position and influence in Asia.  The word Asia, as Henry Kissinger mentions in his book 
World Order, did not exist until the arrival of Western powers that, “(u)ntil the arrival of 
modern Western powers, no Asian language had a word of for ‘Asia’; none of the peoples 
of what are now Asia’s nearly fifty sovereign states conceived of themselves as 
inhabiting a single ‘continent’ or region requiring solidarity with all the others.”62  
Westerners ascribed the term Asia and in sense “unified,” amassing nearly 50 sovereign 
states into one identity.  China was the ruling authority per se of Asia for centuries given 
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its massive territorial influence derived from its population, which equates to the strong 
military power.  Most nations around China had to get approval from the Emperor of 
China on many political issues including domestic affairs and kings of those nations had 
to be formally acknowledged by the emperor and pay an annual tax to thank for the 
blessing of the emperor.  The letter from Emperor of China to King of Britain in the late 
18th century bespeaks China’s impervious position that,  
Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a 
perfect governance and to fulfill [sic] the duties of the State; strange and costly 
objects do not interest me.  If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by 
you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit 
which prompted you to dispatch them from afar…As your Ambassador can see 
for himself, we possess all things.63   
 
Despite Britain’s powerful navy and its eminence around the world as a strong nation at 
the time, the emperor of China explicitly infers that he accepts the gift because he is 
pleased that the King of Britain took efforts to send something to as far as China, where 
the emperor has everything.  Rather discourteous, yet full of autonomy and sovereignty 
are embedded in the letter.   
Myriad studies and researches are conducted in the past several decades about the 
rise of China, and the interconnected reality of the world generally in the segment of 
finance, economy, and politic recognizes that China is, strong.  The U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission report states, “The market dependencies of 
many East Asian countries on China – the result of China’s deep integration into regional 
manufacturing supply chains – afford Beijing greater leverage in pursuing regional 
security interests.”64  The economic growth catalyzed by investments from profit-driven 
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multinational corporations coupled with rigid regulations toward a specific set of 
directions implemented by the Chinese government, of many other factors as well, 
allowed China to become not only a rising superpower but also granted China with 
enormous influence to its trading nations.  Xi Jinping stated at the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia that, “we need to rely on the 
people in Asia to run Asia’s affairs, deal with Asia’s problems, and uphold Asia’s 
security.  The people in Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and 
stability in Asia through enhanced cooperation.”65  Although he didn’t mention the U.S. 
explicitly, the U.S. is the obvious “guardian” of the world, including the Asian Pacific 
region.  The former Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd expressed his concern for 
uncertainty if China does seek to address Asia’s affairs that,  
the truth is that overwhelming U.S. military power combined with 
continued significant U.S. economic power lies very much at the fulcrum 
of the stability of the post-war order.  And if China begins to replace the 
American fulcrum, the legitimate questions from us all is what sort of 
alternative regional and global order would China seek to construct in its 
place.66   
 
If China replaces the U.S. in the region, could China carry out the mission as the U.S. 
did?  Unless the U.S. willingly “surrenders” its influence in the Asia Pacific region, 
Prime Minister Rudd’s concern will not occur.   
The Chinese administration strategically calculates each step to maintain a good 
relationship with the U.S. and pressures U.S. allies at the same time that,  
In the absence of an effective American response, China may yet be able to 
successfully pursue a divide and conquer strategy:  intimidating some of its 
neighbors into acquiescence while isolating and demoralizing others… reaching 
out to Washington and proclaiming its desire to form a ‘new type great power 
 




relationship’ with the United States, while at the same time ratcheting up pressure 
on key targets, especially U.S allies.67   
 
Chinese government’s high level of autonomy coupled with the giant economy could 
overwhelm nearby nations as President Obama expressed in his interview, to eventually 
seek to drive wedges between those nations and the U.S.68 Absences of war in past 
several decades, not counting U.S.-led war against terrorism, has perhaps lulled nations 
under the protection of America in the security measures, focusing a great degree of 
national interests in the economy, which has arguably led to the rise of China.   
The justification for deploying the THAAD was to protect U.S. allies from the 
perceivable threats from North Korea, however, the deployment of the missile defense 
system itself has placed South Korea under scrutiny in a difficult position between China 
and the United States and the ordinary citizens of South Korea had to pay the price.  A 
chicken skewer seller in one of the popular tourist spots in South Korea said in an 
interview that, “I don’t know why we have to the ones that suffer because of politics…I 
watch the news more closely now, especially about THAAD.  In the end, my livelihood 
depends on it.”69  The economic retaliation over the decision to deploy the THAAD 
system should not be taken lightly by the U.S. foreign policymakers since,  
China’s willingness to use economic coercion as a tool to compel South Korea to 
reverse its decision to deploy THAAD could portend similarly aggressive move 
on future occasions where China feels its national interests are being threatened, 
creating a powerful deterrent for other countries involved in potential diplomatic 
or security disputes with China.70 
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The political structure of China allowing top-down decisions to be implemented in a 
matter of hours across the country could deter other Asia nations from cooperating with 
the U.S., placing importance on the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship to 
deter China.   
 The modification to the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation treaty examined based 
on its rationale, could provide a leeway for the Japanese troops to land on the South 
Korean soil to carry on the U.S. military mission on the Korean peninsula.  If this were to 
be true, the opinion of the U.S. troops on South Korea could rapidly become unfavorable, 





Chapter 2 – The Issue of Comfort Women 
The issue of “Comfort Women”71 is a complicated topic that has not attracted the 
global spotlight in decades; the topic only came up to the surface of scholars’ attention in 
the mid-1990s.  The term “Comfort Women” refers to approximately 200,000 young 
females, between 15-25 mostly from Korea, who were forced into sexual slavery by the 
Japanese Imperial Army before and during World War II.  The Japanese Imperial Army 
needed these sexual slaves to stabilize soldiers psychologically, after witnessing random 
sexual violence toward women in occupied territories.72  One of the gruesome 
justifications to kidnap and mobilize young females was to protect soldiers from possibly 
contracting sexually transmitted disease,  
(w)hen the Japanese Army in Manchuria planned special training sessions to 
prepare for war against Russia, the army requested 20,000 women for army 
brothels from the Korean colonial government, and 8,000 were actually mobilized 
for that purpose. The targeted mobilization of Korean women as "comfort 
women" was originally designed to protect Japanese soldiers from STDs because 
Korean young women were believed to be sexually inexperienced and therefore 
uninfected.73 (460) 
 
The “Comfort Women” was, noting the government’s effort to stabilize soldiers by 
targeting young women, then, is a long-held systematic system by the Japanese 
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government enforced by the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army, located in 
mostly every Japanese military station throughout the world. 
Interview records and military archives reveal the gruesome violence to kidnap 
and rape women in countries such as Philippine, China, and South Korea by the Japanese 
Imperial Army.74  The kidnapped women were then sent to different “comfort stations” 
where they had to engage in sexual acts with soldiers against their will.  Yoshimi 
Yoshiaki is a professor of modern Japanese history at Chuo University in Tokyo and a 
founding member of the Center for Research and Documentation of Japan’s War 
Responsibility.  In his book Military Comfort Women, he defined “Comfort Women” as 
“women who provided sexual services to soldiers under the management of the Japanese 
military, with limited freedom under conditions depriving them of human rights.”75 The 
issue of “Comfort Women” is an issue of human rights where the “military kept women 
imprisoned and soldiers gang-raped women through organized violence under conditions 
in which the women had no choice,”76 and the systematic coercive methods such as, 
“deception, abduction, or human trafficking to bring women into ‘comfort stations,’ 
women were imprisoned and turned into sex slaves”77 reveals the human rights violation 
by the Japanese government.   
The “Comfort Women” should have been resolved during the Tokyo Trial set up 
by the United Nations War Crimes Commissions in October 1945 on behalf of 17 Allied 
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Nations to trial and punish war crime criminals.78 Yet, despite numerous evidence of 
abduction and rape, the trial did not address the issue of “Comfort Women,” that, 
(t)he Commission compiled a list of 32 violations of laws and customs of 
war that warranted criminal punishment at the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials.  Listed at numbers 5 and 6 respectively, “rape” and the “abduction 
of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution” appeared 
high on the list alongside other egregious war crimes…had volumes of 
evidence about the establishment and operation of the comfort 
stations…Nonetheless, crimes against the comfort women were never 
tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.79 
 
Furthermore, the 1965 Basic Treaty between Japan and Korea to settle the question of 
war reparation and to establish basic diplomatic relationships failed to discuss the issue of 
the “Comfort Women.”  The treaty discussed Japanese restitution to individual victims 
who suffered during the colonized period but failed to include the victims of “Comfort 
Women.”80   
A Japanese documentary on the issue of “Comfort women” was produced in 1974 
by Senda Kako based on her book Military Comfort Women.  However, Senda portrays 
“Comfort women” as prostitutes and sex workers near the military camps and the 
“comfort stations” as brothels, eliminating the forced nuance of the issue.81  The issue has 
not gained proper attention until 1991 when one of the survivors Kim Hak Sun’s public 
testimony of her experience as a “Comfort Women” was published. 82  The first official 
testimony from the survivors nearly took four decades since the end of the “Comfort 
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Women” and many human rights scholars speculated that the culture of the Eastern Asian 
region embedded the notion of humility and disgrace on the family once the victim, in the 
context of a mother or a wife, is to be found as a “Comfort Women”, as Kim Hak Sun 
mentioned that one of the main reasons to step forward and testifying was because all of 
her family is now dead, that she no longer has anyone to disgrace.83  Moreover, the 
government of Korea since the liberation faced political turmoil, including many civil 
rights and democratization movements sprouted throughout the nation.  The political 
turmoil in its counterpart created oppressive regimes for several decades, which paid no 
attention to human rights, more specifically, women's rights.84   
The testimony echoed throughout the nation and prompted attention that the 
Japanese government had to reply to the alleged actions.  The Japanese government 
admitted the existence of the comfort stations in their military bases, but rejected to admit 
the direct involvement and refused to compensate the victims because  
(1) recent developments in international laws may not be applied 
retroactively; (2) the comfort stations system cannot be accurately 
described as slavery, and the prohibition of slavery was not established as 
a customary norm at the time anyway; (3) acts of rape during armed 
conflict were not explicitly prohibited by international conventions at the 
time; and (4) the laws of war would apply only to Japanese military 
conduct against subjects of belonging to another nation-state at war with 
Japanese and would not cover the actions of Japanese military personnel 
against Korean nationals because Korea was Japan’s colony at the time.85 
 
The reasoning behind the Japanese government outraged many Koreans, especially men, 
as it transpired a sense of unity well explained by a scholar Jungmin Seo,  
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From the perspective of a masculine nation state, women are regarded as 
domesticated for the purpose of national production, therefore the loss of 
the women’s chastity was treated as the loss of nation’s essential property.  
Therefore, the outburst of anger in Korean society apparently took the 
form of Korean men’s anger against Japanese men because of the 
nationalist doctrine that “Korean women’s sexuality belongs to Korean 
men”.86 
 
The Japanese government sensed the urgency to release a statement concerning the issue 
and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono87 delivered the first official government 
response in August 1993, acknowledging the involvement of the military and apologizing 
to victims of “Comfort Women.”  Following the statement, the Asian Women’s Fund 
(AWF) was created under the auspice of the Japanese government to distribute and 
compensate to “Comfort Women” that seek compensation restitution.88  However, the 
AWF was created in a form of a non-governmental organization, a privately-funded 
organization.  The indirect involvement of the Japanese government to this date is seen as 
insincere, as the AWF merely resembles a charity to help out raped victims.89  
 The government of South Korea is demanding nothing more than a sincere 
apology from the government of Japan, which means a resolution and/or legislation 
officially binding apology to the victims of “Comfort Women” and to compensate them 
directly, not through a private charity fund.  In more so, the government of South Korea 
demands that the Education department of Japan to not slant the historical facts about the 
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“Comfort Women.”  A former Japanese middle school teacher interviewed with BBC, 
claims that,  
For three hours a week – 105 hours over the year, we edged towards the 
20th century…it turned out only 19 of the books 357 pages death with 
events between 1931 and 1945…there was another sentence on the 
Koreans…brought to Japan as miners during the war…[explained] in a 
footnote, on “comfort women” – a prostitution corps created by the 
Imperial Army of Japan90 
 
As the interview states, the textbook refers to “Comfort Women” as a prostitution corps, 
which infers that those women were there on their own will.  In response to the then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, Mr. Han’s request in 2001 about the 
selection of history textbooks in middle school, then Japanese Foreign Affairs Mr. 
Tanaka replied that,  
Japan has made explanations to the ROK on Japan's view on history and 
its textbook authorization procedure, and it recognizes that the 
Government of the ROK, taking such Japanese stance into account, 
formulated its stance after serious and careful considerations. The 
Government of Japan regards it important to accept this with sincerity and 
study it closely.91 
 
Yet, the interview was conducted in March of 2013, and the issue is still ongoing, which 
demonstrates the Japanese government’s reluctance to change the history textbook. 
 On the other hand, the Japanese government insists on the position that they have 
done everything they can to ameliorate the situation, resembling the civil remedies in a 
way, that they are not criminally responsible for the “Comfort Women” because past war 
criminal trials had no verdicts against the issue of “Comfort Women.”  Therefore, the 
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appropriate measures are taken, such as the fund, available via the AWF to “Comfort 
Women” victims and although not guilty of, official apologies were given through the 
Kono statement.  
 The ongoing demand for official apologies from the South Korean government 
has placed the Japanese government under the “apology-fatigue,” that Japan is tired of 
apologizing.  This “apology-fatigue” has prompted a movement towards a strong nation, 
pre-war era Imperial Japan by neo-nationalist extreme right-wing politicians including 
the incumbent Prime Minister Abe.92  The government of the United States has not 
directly involved in the “Comfort Women” issue, obviously due to the sensitive nature of 
the issue and tangled complexity of the political relationship.  However, Congress acted 
on to address the issue via a Simple Resolution.  A simple resolution, “…may express the 
opinion of one Chamber, or the other on foreign policy of other executive business.”93  
Albeit it has no legal binding force, it is a direct message of the House of Congress.  H. 
Res. 121 was sponsored by Rep. Michael Honda (D-FL) with 167 co-sponsors during the 
110th Congress94 and the purpose of the resolution was to condemn the Japanese 
government for its unsophisticated position in dealing with the issues of “Comfort 
Women,” urging that,  
(t)he Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and 
accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its 
Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery, 
known to the world as ‘Comfort Women’, during its colonial and wartime 
occupation of Asia and Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the 
duration of World War II.95 
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Although a simple resolution does not have the force of law, 168 signatures of the House 
of Representatives members bespeaks the weight of the “Comfort Women” issue in the 
heart of the American politic.  The H. Res. 121 consists of 11 statements reasoning why 
the House of Congress is expressing its concern on the issue of “Comfort Women” and 
how the Government of Japan responded to the issue in the past.  The first and second 
statements describe forced sexual servitude of victims that, 
(w)hereas the ‘comfort women’ system of forced military prostitution by 
the Government of Japan, considered unprecedented in its cruelty and 
magnitude, included gang rape, forced abortions, humiliation, and sexual 
violence resulting in mutilation, death, or eventual suicide in one of the 
largest cases of human trafficking in the 20th century.96 
 
The third statement of the H. Res. 121 states, “(w)hereas some new textbooks 
used in Japanese schools seek to downplay the ‘comfort women’ tragedy and other 
Japanese war crimes during World War II”.97  Despite the 2001 response from the then 
Japanese Foreign Affairs Mr. Tanaka, the history textbook issue has still not been 
resolved and a paragraph in the House Resolution demonstrates the importance of 
printing the correct historical facts even in the eyes of the U.S. Congress. 
The fourth statement states, “(w)hereas Japanese public and private officials have 
recently expressed a desire to dilute or rescind the 1993 statement by Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yohei Kono on the ‘comfort women’, which expressed the Government’s 
sincere apologies and remorse for their ordeal.”98  In 2007, Abe made a public statement 







licensed prostitutes.  Moreover, he visited Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine built as homage paid 
to Class-A Japanese war criminals whose sprits are housed, which reflects unapologetic 
and unrepentant gestures to Koreans and other war victims.99  The ongoing demand for 
official apologies from the Korean government and other nations such as the U.S. has 
placed the Japanese government under the “apology-fatigue,” that Japan is tired of 
apologizing.  This “apology-fatigue” has prompted a movement towards a strong nation, 
pre-war era Imperial Japan by neo-nationalist extreme right-wing politicians including 
the incumbent Prime Minister Abe.100  The Japanese government insists on the position 
that they have done everything they can to ameliorate the situation yet the Korean 
government demands apologies, that “(s)eoul continually makes new claims, moving the 
goalposts and making it impossible ever to reach a satisfactory conclusion.”101    
 The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth statements refer to treaties and the importance 
of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan that they must be on the same page in securing 
fundamental human rights and democratic values.  It is important to note the fifth 
statement that, “(w)hereas the Government of Japan did sign the 1921 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children…”102  In response 
to the government of South Korea’s demand for apology and compensation to its victims, 
Japan rejected to admit the direct involvement and refused to compensate the victims 
because,  
(1) recent developments in international laws may not be applied 
retroactively; (2) the comfort stations system cannot be accurately 
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described as slavery, and the prohibition of slavery was not established as 
a customary norm at the time anyway; (3) acts of rape during armed 
conflict were not explicitly prohibited by international conventions at the 
time; and (4) the laws of war would apply only to Japanese military 
conduct against subjects of belonging to another nation-state at war with 
Japanese and would not cover the actions of Japanese military personnel 
against Korean nationals because Korea was Japan’s colony at the time.103 
 
Of the four reasons outlined by the government of Japan, the first and second reason 
directly conflicts with the signed treaty in 1921.  The “recent development in 
international law” refers to human rights extending over to trafficking issues, which are 
derived from the original context of the 1921 treaty by the League of Nations.  The treaty 
contains a signature of “His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: His Excellency M. le Baron 
G Hayashi, Ambassador at London, Delegate to the Second Assembly of the League of 
Nations”104; the law is proactive.   
The ninth, tenth and eleventh statements refer to the Asian Women’s Fund that, 
“(w)hereas the Asian Women’s Fund has raised $5,700,000 to extend ‘atonement’ from 
the Japanese people to the comfort women.”105  The Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) was 
created under the auspice of the Japanese government to distribute and compensate to 
“Comfort Women” that seek compensation restitution.106  However, the AWF was 
created in a form of a non-governmental organization, a privately-funded organization.  
The indirect involvement of the Japanese government was, and to this date, is seen 
insincere, as the AWF merely resembles a charity to help raped victims.107  
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Following 11 specific statements explaining what the government of Japan has 
done, the H. Res. 121 lists four remedies.  The number three of the remedies states, “the 
Government of Japan…(3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual 
enslavement and trafficking of the ‘comfort women’ for the Japanese Imperial Armed 
Forces never occurred.”108  The Japanese Imperial Army needed sexual slaves to stabilize 
soldiers psychologically, after witnessing random sexual violence toward women in 
occupied territories.109  The “Comfort Women” was, remarking the government’s effort 
to stabilize soldiers, then, was a systematic protocol by the Japanese government 
empowered by the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army, located in mostly every 
Japanese military station throughout the world.  The “Comfort Women” should have 
been resolved during the Tokyo Trial set up by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commissions in October 1945 on behalf of 17 Allied Nations to trial and punish war 
crime criminals,110   
The Commission compiled a list of 32 violations of laws and customs of 
war that warranted criminal punishment at the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials.  Listed at numbers 5 and 6 respectively, “rape” and the “abduction 
of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution” appeared 
high on the list alongside other egregious war crimes…had volumes of 
evidence about the establishment and operation of the comfort 
stations…Nonetheless, crimes against the comfort women were never 
tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.111 
 
One of the reasons why Japan was not tried is the possible intervention of the U.S. in the 
process.  The evidence revealed the wrong conduct of the U.S. Army tantamount to what 
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the Japanese Imperial Army had done during World War II.  Nicola Henry argues that 
one of the reasons why the Allied power did not prosecute Japanese War criminals with 
charges on the “Comfort Women” despite numerous pieces of evidence indicating the 
truth were because of the Recreation and Amusement Association, that “prosecutors did 
not prosecute sexual enslavement to avoid scrutiny of their own complicity in the comfort 
stations.  At the end of the War in 1945, US soldiers visited brothers under the auspices 
of the Recreation and Amusement Association for almost a year, until General Mac 
Arthur had them closed down in 1946.”112  Furthermore, Chou argues that the U.S. knew 
about the brothels, but the Cold War came after World War II which shifted the 
international politics towards containing the Soviets that the U.S. needed to build a 
relationship with Japan to balance and maintain influence in the region.113 
Professor Doolan is an Assistant Professor of History and Women's, Gender, and 
Sexuality Studies at Brandeis University and she argues that the illegal massage parlors 
in southern military communities in the United States were encouraged by the military 
prostitution by the U.S. military in South Korea.  She states, “(i)n January of 1947, a 
circular from the headquarters of United States Army Forces in Korea instructed all male 
personnel ‘to refrain from association with Korean women,’ forbidding relations with 
local girls ‘other than through the lowest form of prostitution.”’114  She further states, “in 
1945, when some 72,000 American soldiers arrived to transfer power from the devastated 
Japanese empire following Allied victory in World War II, American soldiers were 
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allowed to visit the various colonial era brothels that existed around US military 
installations once belonging to the Imperial Army.”115  Prohibiting all types of 
relationships with Korean women other than to engage in prostitution was an order 
governing the U.S. soldiers in South Korea post the WW2.  The U.S. Army Military 
Government in Korea, which existed from 1945 to 1948 to govern in the absence of an 
official Korean government enacted Ordinance No. 72, which criminalized Korean 
women to engage in sexual intercourse with the U.S. soldiers while suffering from a 
venereal disease.116  The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea was “the only lawful 
authority in the southern part of the peninsula, the military government functioned as an 
occupation force whose sole mission was supposedly to protect and defend the 
sovereignty of South Korea and to maintain civil order until the establishment of an 
independent South Korean government.”117  The Ordinance No. 72 bespeaks the U.S. 
military’s heightened awareness of prostitution and further serves as evidence that instead 
of prohibiting such acts, the U.S. military condoned prostitution.  The U.S. military being 
the only lawful authority of South Korea, the protective measurement to contain a 
possible epidemic in military bases was to prohibit sexual intercourse if the female is 
tested positive with the venereal disease, not prohibiting the prostitution.  Albeit the 
prostitution is profoundly different from forced sexual slavery, the notion of an allied 
troop deeming the Korean women in general as nothing more than prostitutes does not 
paint a good image for the U.S. military in South Korea, rather could be painted as, “U.S. 
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achieve the dual goals of satisfying soldiers' sexual desires and controlling STDs during 
the period of U.S. military government rule.”118  Because the United States is cognizant 
of the international norms on forced sexual slavery, the only governing authority in South 
Korea enacted a measure to kill two birds with one stone legally – prevent STDs while 
fulfilling soldiers’ sexual demands. 
After decades of disagreement on the issue of the “Comfort Women,” a historical 
agreement was reached on December 28, 2015, between the two governments.  Although 
one cannot be certain of decision-making factors without having access to all of the 
government documents, the derailing political relationship between the two governments 
from the thorny “Comfort Women” issue was no longer bearable considering the strategic 
importance of the tri-lateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan relationship safeguarding East Asia 
against China and nuclear threats from North Korea.  The Washington Post published an 
article with the title “Agreement on ‘comfort women’ offers strategic benefits to the U.S. 
in Asia-Pacific” on January 6, 2016, shortly after the agreement. The article states, “ 
(t)he United States did not broker the accord or attempt to perform the type of role 
it has played in the Mideast peace process or some other foreign disputes.  But 
Obama administration officials – including the president himself – intervened at 
pivotal points over the past two years to help bring Abe and Park closer together, 
fostering an environment that made it possible for the two countries to settle their 
grievances over the ‘comfort women.’119 
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In the agreement, both governments expressly mentioned that the agreement 
resolved the “Comfort Women” issue “finally and irreversibly.”120  The final and 
irreversible nature of the agreement shows that the governments were quick to put an end 
to the dragging issue of the “Comfort Women” deteriorating their political relationship 
with each other.  The Diplomat reported that,” (m)ost notably, the agreement 
provides  face-saving solution for South Korea while allowing Japan to remain consistent 
with its past position that all the issues related to Japan’s wartime wrongdoings were 
resolved with the signing of Japan-ROK Basic Treaty in 1965 and thus Tokyo is not 
obligated to compensate the individuals directly.”121  The face-saving solution connotates 
the demand from South Korea to receive an official apology from the head of the 
government of Japan.  While the prime minister Abe did not express apology directly, the 
Japanese foreign minister who delivered the message that the, “(p)rime Minister Abe 
expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent 
immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological 
wounds as comfort women.”122  
 South Korean advocacy groups expressed their disappointment that the agreement 
on the “Comfort Women” is a “diplomatic humiliation.”123  The Korean Council for the 
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Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery pointed out that the agreement does not 
acknowledge a horrendous systematic crime by the government of Japan.124  The 
agreement states that, “(t)he issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the 
Japanese military authorities at the time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of 
large numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of 
responsibilities from this perspective.”125  The agreement continues, stating, “…the 
Government of Japan will now take measures to heal psychological wounds for all 
former comfort women through its budget…”126  Placing a boundary on the issue of 
“Comfort Women” within the “Japanese military authorities at the time” is a denial of the 
direct involvement of the Japanese government, which contradicts pieces of evidence 
showing otherwise.  The agreement “final and irreversibly” unshackles the government of 
Japan from being criminally responsible for the “Comfort Women” because past war 
criminal trials had no verdicts against the issue of “Comfort Women.”  S.J. Friedman is 
the author of “Silenced No More: Voices of Comfort Women” and she interviewed the 
“Comfort Women” survivors where she was told that they do not want the money; they 
want a sincere apology.127  Friedman’s interview is consistent with that of previous 
requests from the “Comfort Women” survivors that they do not seek payment or 
monetary gain.  A sincere apology, which Friedman mentions could be similar to, “the 
one that Willy Brandt gave at the Holocaust memorial.  The Holocaust survivors said 
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they were healed by that apology.”128  It may not be the kneeling gesture by Willy Brandt 
that the “Comfort Women” survivors wish to see, but the sincere message conveyed from 
the gesture is what they wish to receive.   
 There were approximately 50 “Comfort Women” survivors alive in South Korea 
in 2015, unfortunately, the number dropped to approximately 20 in 2019.129  Perhaps the 
government of Japan waits until there are no more survivors, deadening the sensitivity 
and urgency to apologies sincerely.  Shortly after the passage of the resolution H. Res. 
121 of the 110th Congress, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Canada, and the European 
Union passed similar resolutions calling upon the government of Japan to apologizes.130  
In October of 2015, San Francisco Board of Education unanimously approved a 
resolution to teach staff and students to learn about human trafficking, commercial sexual 
exploitation of children, and “the history of World War II ‘comfort women’ under the 
Japanese military…”131 will be taught during history or social studies classes in 
secondary schools. The influence of the United States Congress even on matters 
unrelated to domestic affairs demonstrates that perhaps the “Comfort Women” issue 
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Chapter 3 – The Liancourt Rocks dispute 
Similar to the “Comfort Women” issue, the territorial dispute between the 
government of South Korea and the government of Japan has been a complicated and 
controversial topic to the government of the U.S.  The U.S. remains silent on voicing its 
stance on the issue, yet encouraging South Korea and Japan to ameliorate their 
differences in order to straighten the U.S. – South Korea – Japan tri-relationship in the 
East Asia region.  
Liancourt Rocks is a group of islets in the East Sea claimed by both South Korea 
and Japan. The islets consist of two main islets and 35 smaller rocks with approximately 
46 acres surface area of rocks combined. It is located at about 131°52′ East longitude and 
about 37°14′ North latitude, equidistant to South Korea and Japan.   
 
Figure 1. Location of Liancourt Rocks 
 
South Korea claims its sovereignty based on a prolonged history of documents 
antedated as far as 512 AD, whereas Japan claims its sovereignty mainly based on the 
interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.  There had been several 
attempts by Japan to bring the disputed matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
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but the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the disputes only if the parties of the dispute agree to 
bring the case to the Court. South Korea rejected and continually rejects the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ because they believe that the islets are not a matter of dispute since the 
sovereign authority of the islets belongs to them.  The government of South Korea’s 
position on bringing the matter to the ICJ is, “(t)he proposal [to submit the case to ICJ] of 
the [Japanese] government is nothing but another false attempt disguised in the form of 
judicial procedures.  Korea has the territorial rights ab initio over Dokdo and sees no 
reason why she should seek the verification of such rights before any international 
court.”132 
  Liancourt Rocks is called Dokdo in Korean which means solitary islands.  Based 
on the records in Sejong Sillok Jiriji (Geography Section of the Annals of King Sejong’s 
Reign), the Joseon (Korean) government publication in 1454, the Dokdo is treated as a 
part of Joseon’s Uljin-hyeon (Uljin province).  The record also indicates that the 
Liancourt Rocks had been territories of Usan-guk (Usan State), which Silla133 conquered 
in the early 6th century, indicating South Korea’s effective control over Liancourt Rocks 
extends back to the year 512.134  There are consistent records found in Sinjeung Dongguk 
Yeoji Seungnam (Revised and Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea) of 1531, 
Dongguk Munheon Biggo (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea) of 1770, 
Man-gi Yoram (Manual of State Affairs for the Monarch) of 1808, and Jeungbo Munheon 
Biggo (Revised and Enlarged Edition of the Reference Compilation of Documents on 
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Korea) of 1908.135  Based on historical evidence, the government of South Korea 
maintains the position that, “(d)okdo is an integral part of Korean territory, historically, 
geographically and under international law.  No territorial dispute exists regarding 
Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic 
negotiations or judicial settlement.”136   
The first instance of the dispute surrounding the Liancourt Rocks between South 
Korea and Japan dates to 1669, referred to as the Ulleung-do dispute.  Ulleung-do is a 
habitable island to the left of Liancort Rocks and the Ohya and Murakawa families of 
Tottori-han (feudal clan of Tottori) of Japan argued with Korean fishermen about fishing 
rights around the Liancourt Rocks in 1693.  The Ohya and Murakawa families petitioned 
the Japanese government (Edo shogunate) to prohibit the Koreans passage to the 
Ulleung-do, and the response was to negotiate with the Joseon government.137  After the 
negotiation, the Tottori-han responded to the Japanese government that neither Ulleung-
do nor Liancourt Rocks belonged to Tottori-han, which led the Japanese government to 
issue a directive in January 1696, prohibiting all Japanese fishermen from making 
passages through Ulleung-do.138  The directive states,  
…it [Ulleung-do] is undoubtedly Choson’s [South Korea] territory.  The country 
could settle the matter by military power, but is not our policy to impair the good-
neighborly relations over a useless, small island.  From the beginning, that island 
was never taken from Choson by force, and it does not make sense for Choson to 
turn it over to us.   The only thing to do is to prohibit permanently the Japanese 





137 Ibid.   
138 Ibid.  
49 
 
Liancourt Rocks was not the definitive object discussed in the directive, yet the proximity 
of the Ulleung-do to the Liancourt Rocks considered the Liancourt Rocks as its ancillary.   
In 1877, a directive issued to the Ministry of Home Affairs by the Dajokan 
(Grand Council of State) confirms the result of the negotiation in the “Ulleung-do 
dispute.”  The 1877 directive states that, “(i)t was confirmed through the negotiations 
between the old government [Edo shogunate] and the Joseon [Korea] government that the 
two islands [Liancourt Rocks and Ulleung-do] do not belong to our country [Japan].”139  
The Dajokan sent a directive to the Ministry of Home Affairs stating, “(r)egarding two 
islands [Ulleungdo and Liancourt Rocks] …bear in mind that our country [Japan] has 
nothing to do with them.”140  The Dajokan Order of 1877 confirmed the 1696 directive 
that the Liancourt Rocks is not Japanese territory.  
Unlike South Korea, which argues for sovereignty over Liancourt Rocks based on 
historical documents, Japan argues their historical claim by proving that those presented 
in historical documents from South Korea are misinterpreted.  According to the 
publication of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2012, Japan’s position on 
South Korea’s occupation of Liancourt Rocks is,  
The occupation of Takeshima by the ROK is an illegal occupation undertaken on 
absolutely no basis of international law. No measure taken by the ROK during its 
illegal occupation with regard to Takeshima has any legal justification. This 
illegal occupation is not acceptable in any way, given Japan's position on its 
sovereignty over Takeshima. Japan has been consistently making strong protests 
against each and every measure taken by the ROK and demanding the withdrawal 
of the measure.141 
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Japan further asserts that the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks is with Japan based on 
international legal doctrine terra nullius, which means unoccupied land.142 
At the beginning of the 1900s, sea lion hunting developed around Liancourt 
Rocks and attracted competitive hunting.  Yozaburo Nakai, a resident of the Oki Islands 
of Shimane Prefecture, submitted a request in September 1904 to government ministers, 
including Home Minister, Foreign Minister, and Agriculture and Commerce Minister to 
incorporate the territory of the Liancourt Rocks under the jurisdiction of Oki Islands and 
to extend a 10-year lease on its utilization.143  Nakai planned to monopolize the sea lion 
hunting business in the region.  Subsequently, the Russo-Japanese War broke off in 1904, 
prompting the Japanese Navy to build watchtowers along the east coast of Korea to 
monitor the Russian Navy activities.  The Liancourt Rocks was deemed a suitable 
location to build one of the watchtowers, and the government condoned Nakai’s request 
to bring the Liancourt Rocks under the jurisdiction of the Oki Island branch on the 
ground of terra nullius and officially named as "Takeshima." 144, 145  Based on the 
opinion of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, “building a watchtower and installing 
radio transmissions or submarine telegraph communication systems on Takeshima would 
give us an advantage in terms of monitoring enemy ships.”146  The need to incorporate 
the Liancourt Rocks under the Japanese territory for military strategy has created Japan’s 
first historical claim over the islets. 
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Following the end of World War II, the United States and allies began 
rehabilitation of war-devasted Japan.  In September of 1945, United States General 
Douglas MacArthur was appointed as a commander of the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP).  In accordance with the Potsdam doctrine, the SCAP became the 
sole authority over Japan.  Reports of General MacArthur notes that,  
from the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese 
Government to rule the state will be subject to you and you will take such steps as 
you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms.  You will exercise supreme 
command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for 
enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Forces concerned.147 
 
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ Instructions (SCAPINS) was an 
established form of communication between the SCAP and the administrative bodies of 
the Japanese Government.148 The memorandum No. 677, issued on January 29, 1946, 
states that, “for the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main 
islands of Japan…and excluding…Liancourt Rocks.”149  Following the issuance, General 
MacArthur divided the Liancourt Rocks from Japan, which is later known as the 
“MacArthur Line.”150  The clear intention to exclude the Liancourt Rocks with the power 
vested in the commander of the SCAP is a piece of evidence that the Liancourt Rocks is 
under the territory of South Korea.  In addition to the SCAPIN memorandum No. 677, 
memorandum No. 1033 was issued to prohibit Japanese vessels or personnel from 
coming within 12 nautical miles of the Liancourt Rocks, stating, “Japanese vessels or 
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personnel thereof will not approach closer than twelve miles to Takeshima nor have any 
contact with said island.”151   
The government of Japan argues that the SCAPINS memorandum No. 677 and 
No. 1033 are not “an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of 
territory,”152 that the San Francisco Treaty Peace Treaty decided the territory of Japan.  
The MacArthur line was abolished following the signing of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, and in response, the government of South Korea unilaterally declared Rhee Line, 
named after the then-president Seungman Rhee.   
The San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on April 28, 1952, which legally 
ended World War II and restored “diplomatic ties, reparations, territorial concessions, the 
treatment of expired commerce and navigation treaties, and other issues to resolve war-
instigated problems and lay out the principles for postwar relations.153  The treaty was 
signed in San Francisco and was drafted by the U.S. government officials, William J. 
Sebald and John Foster Dulles.  
 William J. Sebald was the first person in charge of drafting the San Francisco 
peace treaty.  In the first five drafts of the treaty from 1947 to 1949, the treaty excluded 
Liancourt rocks from Japan states that, “(J)apan hereby renounces all rights and titles to 
Korea and all minor offshore Korean islands, including…Liancourt Rocks”154  Towards 
the end of 1949, the United States reevaluated this position, as Sebald mentioned that, 
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“security considerations might also conceivably render the provision of weather and radio 
stations on these islands [Liancourt Rocks] a matter of interest to the United States.”155  
Due to the location of the islands, the allied power asserted jurisdiction over Liancourt 
rocks for use as a bombing range.  Following the reevaluation, the 6th draft was 
composed, which excluded Liancourt rocks, “(t)he territory of Japan shall comprise the 
four principal Japanese home islands…including the islands of the Inland sea…and all 
other islands in the Japan sea within a line connecting the farther shores of Tsushima, 
Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks), and Rebun…”156  The 6th draft of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty outweighed the importance of military strategy for the U.S. over the historical 
facts on the sovereignty of the islets.  
 In April 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed to oversee the peace treaty 
process.  A couple of months later, the Korean War broke out, which complicated the 
geopolitical situation.  Dulles made no mention of who controlled Liancourt Rocks in the 
drafts 10th through 13th; the 14th included Liancourt Rocks in Japan, the 15th through 18th 
drafts again made no mention of Liancourt Rocks.   
 As the Korean War worsened for the allied troops defending South Korea, 
General MacArthur faced a conundrum.  He knew that he had to transfer troops stationed 
in Japan to South Korea; otherwise, South Korea will not stand a chance against the 
communist North Korean troops.  However, if he transferred troops, Japan would become 
vulnerable to a possible Soviet invasion.  Facing the urgent matter, his solution was to 
create a force of 75,000 Japanese men, “National Police Reserve.”  The urgency to 
finalize the peace treaty to legally create an armed force in Japan hastened the treaty draft 
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process.  The San Francisco Treaty officially declared the National Police Reserve as the 
Japanese Self-Defense Force and the treaty transferred further responsibilities regarding 
armed forces from the SCAP to Japan.157   
 The finalized draft of the peace treaty excluded Liancourt Rocks from Japan’s 
renouncement, reflecting the U.S.’s geopolitical interest and its fear of spreading 
communism in East Asia.  Although the U.S. fought for South Korea, the unfavorable 
outcome of the North invading the South still existed, which implies the possibility of the 
Korean peninsula becoming a communist country.  The Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) reported that, “(K)orean passion for unity and independence is strong enough to 
blind South Koreans to the fact that a coalition government, including the North Korean 
People’s Committee and the South Korean Left, would be the first step toward soviet 
domination of the entire country.”158  If the treaty implicated the sovereignty of Liancourt 
Rocks to South Korea and South Korea came under the communist influence, the 
Liancourt Rocks could become a missile site for the Soviets to threaten U.S. influence in 
Japan, considering the proximity to the mainland.159  Upset by the finalized version of the 
treaty excluding Japan from renouncing the Liancourt Rocks, then the Korean 
ambassador to the U.S. sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State in July 1951.  However, 
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, replied in August of that year, stating, ”US 
could not agree to change because Dokdo was, according to our information, never 
treated as part of Korea, noting that Japan had claimed it since 1905…”160  The Assistant 
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Secretary of State’s argument failed to discuss the strategic importance of the Liancourt 
Rocks for the allied troops to defend the East Asia region against a possible spread of 
communism, rather referenced Japan’s claim over the Liancourt Rocks from the 
annexation in 1905.  
 The urgent matter to transfer troops and the fear of the Korean peninsula 
becoming a communist state expedited the draft of the peace treaty.  Thus, to draw 
consensus amongst signatories in a short amount of time, the finalized draft became short 
and excluded possible contentious matters to eliminate any debates that would delay the 
signing ceremony.  John Yoo is a professor of Law at the University of California at 
Berkeley and has published numerous articles on the territorial dispute issue surrounding 
the Liancourt Rocks.  Yoo summarizes the influence of the geopolitics surrounding the 
East Asia region as the Cold War emerged on the San Francisco Peace Treaty that, 
In 1945 the United States favored a settlement that clearly awarded Dokdo to 
Korea and subjected Japan to territorial losses and severe restrictions on its 
military and economic capabilities. By 1951, Japan was restored to its sovereignty 
as an independent nation, bound to the United States with a security alliance, but 
free to develop its economic power. The United States was silent on the Dokdo 
issue, one of the many unresolved issues in the peace treaty. That change in the 
American position of 1945 to its stance in the 1951 peace treaty was heavily 
influenced by the imperatives of the Cold War.161 
 
 Among the signatories of the peace treaty, South Korea never signed the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, simply because South Korea was never invited to the peace 
treaty signing ceremony.  The U.S. originally intended to invite South Korea to the 
ceremony as a method to publicize the legitimacy of its independence, but Dulles stopped 
the invitation.  He mentioned that, “only those nations in a state of war with Japan and 
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which were signatories of the United Nations Declarations of 1942 would sign the 
treaty”162  However, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signatories, Vietnam and Laos 
were not signatories of the United Nations Declarations of 1942.   
The government of South Korea’s claim of its sovereignty despite the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty excluding the Liancourt Rocks is based on the treaty itself 
explicitly mentioning three islands to belong to South Korea.  Article 2 of the treaty 
states, “Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim 
to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.”163  South Korea 
claims that there are over 3000 islands in the territory of South Korea, that, “the mere fact 
that Dokdo is not explicitly mentioned in the said article does not suggest that Dokdo is 
not included among those territories of Korea separated from Japan.”164  This claim, 
however, could be contentious given that the treaty could not possibly have captured the 
names of over 3000 islands.   
An assumption behind the reason why South Korea was not invited to the 
ceremony is possibly presented through the joint intention of the U.S. and Japan.  The 
peace treaty not only satisfies written conditions regarding what a nation can and cannot 
do but also gives benefits to the people of signatory states.  Professor Seokwoo Lee and 
Jon Von Dykes mention that, “(U)S wanted to exclude Koreans living in Japan from the 
property benefits that allied civilians would receive under the treaty…Dulles suggested 
that many of these Koreans [in Japan] were undesirable, being in many cases from North 
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Korea and the constituting center for Communist agitation in Japan”165  The monetary 
benefits from the treaty to Koreans living in Japan, in Dulles’ perspective, would be 
giving money to communists.   
How would the Liancourt Rock dispute unfold if the ICJ was to hear the case?  
Albeit the government of South Korea continually rejects to have the dispute heard by the 
ICJ, based on previous territorial dispute cases, one could assume how the verdict would 
unfold in the eyes of the ICJ.   
Miniquiers and Ecrehos Case (1953) 
In 1953, the ICJ agreed to hear a case submitted by France and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) to decide on the territorial dispute over the Miniquiers and Ecrehos 
islands located in the English Channel between Jersey (U.K.) and the mainland of 
France.166  The Court reviewed various historical documents and awarded both islands to 
the UK.  The Court reasoned its decision based on historical administration over the 
territory exercised by past British Kings, stating,  
On the basis of various medieval documents, it held the 
view that the King of England exercised his justice and 
levied his rights in these islets which showed that there was 
a close relationship between the Ecrehos and 
Jersey…various facts showed that Jersey authorities have, 
in several ways, exercised ordinary local administration in 
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respect of the Minquiers during the long period of 
time…”167 
 
The decisive importance, in this case, was, “…direct evidence of possession and the 
actual exercise of sovereignty.168  The Court considered historical documents submitted 
by the U.K. as compelling evidence to prove that the U.K. exercised sovereignty over the 
two islands. 
France argued that its sovereignty was based on the sole charge of lighting and 
buoying the islands without encountering objections from the U.K.  The Court rejected 
France’s argument, claiming that the French government did so to aid navigation and to 
protect their ships against reefs located around the islands, not as a sovereign authority of 
the islands, but for the protection of its citizens.  
Case Concerning The Temple of Preah Vihear (1962) 
The subject of dispute was sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah 
Vihear, which sat on the border of Cambodia and Thailand.  Both parties made their 
claims based on the treaty in 1904.  The main component of the treaty was to establish a 
Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission to map the frontier region.  Not being capable of 
mapping their boundary, the Siamese government requested French officers to map the 
frontier region.169  The map was completed in 1907 by a team of French officers, and  
based on the map, the temple was situated in Cambodia.   
Thailand argued that the map was not the work of Mixed Commissions, thus, it 
had no binding character.  The Court rejected this claim, stating, “(s)ince there was no 
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reaction on the part of the Siamese authorities, either then or for many years, they must 
be held to have acquiesced…if the Siamese authorities accepted the map without 
investigation, they could not now plead any error vitiating the reality of their consent.”170   
In addition, the Court also noted that in the 1925 and 1937 Franco-Siamese Treaties, 
Thailand did not raise the issue of either the map or the sovereignty of the temple.171  
Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded that Thailand had accepted the map; 
therefore, Cambodia had sovereignty over the temple. 
Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (2002) 
The dispute over the islands between Indonesia and Malaysia fomented from the 
parties’ different interpretations of the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands.  Indonesia argued that, “…based primarily on a conventional title, the 1891 
convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, islands lie to the south of the 
established parallel line between the British and Dutch, therefore follows that under the 
convention title to those islands vested in the Netherlands, and now vests in 
Indonesia.”172 However, Malaysia argued that, “1891 Convention, when seen as a whole, 
clearly shows that Great Britain and the Netherlands sought by the Convention solely to 
clarify the boundary between their respective land possessions on the islands of Borneo 
and Sebatik.”173 
After examining the 1891 Convention, the Court concluded that the islands 
belong to Malaysia, “confirmed both by the travaus preparatoires and by the subsequent 
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conduct of the parties to the convention”174  The Court rejected Indonesia’s argument of 
effectivites, claiming the sovereignty based on Indonesian fishermen traditionally 
accessed water around the region. The Court stated that based on, “activities by private 
persons cannot be seen as effectivites if they do not take place of the basis of official 
regulations or under government authority.”175  
On the contrary, the Court accepted the effectivites of Malaysia on the islands 
based on the history of regulating turtle eggs, followed by the Turtle Preservation 
Ordinance of 1917 of the Malaysian government.176  The Court relied on the turtle 
preservation because it demonstrated, “legislative, administrative, and quasi-judicial acts” 
and that no disagreements or protests from Indonesia or its predecessor, the Netherlands, 
were expressed.177  
The Chapter VI, Article 22 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty gives the ICJ the 
jurisdiction to hear a case, “(i)f in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has 
arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not 
settled by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of party thereto, be referred 
to decision to the International Court of Justice.”178  Hypothetically, if the government of 
South Korea and the government of Japan agree to have the Liancourt Rock dispute 
adjudicated by the ICJ, the ICJ will have the jurisdiction to hear the case not only based 
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to present its sides with historical documents and subsequent treaties.  Although the ICJ 
does not rely on precedents, the prior territorial dispute cases can guide the possible 
outcomes of the Court’s holding.   
 Based on the Temple of Preah Vihear case, the Court will likely award the 
Liancourt Rocks to South Korea.  The Court awarded the temple to Cambodia based 
upon the map drawn by the Mixed Commissions.  The Court also noted that Thailand 
failed to raise any disagreements about the location of the temple on the map in the 1925 
and 1937 Franco-Siamese treaties.   
 Likewise, the Rhee Line, following the MacArthur line that included Liancourt 
Rocks in South Korea, was not challenged in the 1962 Normalization Treaty.  The 
Normalization treaty in essence promoted healthier diplomatic relations between the two 
countries by having Japan acknowledge its wrongdoings during the annexation of Korea 
and awarding victims with monetary compensation.  South Korea and Japan entered into 
the 1965 Normalization Treaty without any reference to the Liancourt Rocks, which in 
the eyes of the Court could be viewed as, “…particularly Korea’s immediate possession 
and exercise of control over Dokdo and Japan’s acquiescence that can be found in its 
acceptance of the 1965 Normalization Treaty.”179  The current position of the Japanese 
government concerning the Rhee Line is, “(e)stablishment of this line, encompassing the 
islands of Takeshima and a large area of water and fisheries jurisdiction, was a unilateral 
act in contravention of international law.”180  The government of Japan could have raised 
its concern of the Rhee Line including the Liancourt Rocks, which is considered as their 
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territory based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty during the 1962 Normalization Treaty, 
yet they did not. 
After the Court examined travaus preparatoires and effectivites in the Ligitan and 
Sipadan case, it awarded the islands to Malaysia.  The San Francisco Peace Treaty was 
drafted 18 times before the finalized version was signed; many events affected the draft 
of the treaty.  The original intent of the treaty was clear, that Liancourt Rocks was 
included in South Korea.  Had the Korean War not transpired, perhaps Sebald would 
have been in charge of drafting the treaty and the finalized version would have been more 
detailed.  In terms of effectivites, the Court ruled in Ligitan and Sipadan that activities by 
individuals do not suffice effectivites in the absence of administrative authority.  Before 
Japan’s acknowledgment of Liancourt Rocks in 1904 for stabilizing sea lion hunting in 
the region, many historical documents illustrate the administrative functions of the 
Korean government on the islands.  The Court also ruled in favor of the U.K. in the 
Miniquiers and Ecrehos case, which considered various medieval documents that 
outlined the administrative functions of the U.K.  Considering the original intent of the 
treaty and the administrative function of the Korean government, the ICJ will likely 
award the islets to South Korea.   
The Court will examine the San Francisco Peace Treaty and consider the intent of 
the treaty, geopolitics, and international conflicts at the time.  The Court will also 
examine the reason behind why South Korea was not invited to the signing ceremony and 
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because South Korea is not a signatory state, the peace treaty has no binding effect on 
South Korea’s claim over Liancourt Rocks.   
The disputed sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks between South Korea and Japan 
would resolve rather smoothly and unambiguously if both countries agree to let the ICJ 
hear the case.  The Court will rule in favor of South Korea based upon its historical 
sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks as early as 512 AD, whereas Japan’s historical 
claim begins in the early 20th century, which coincides with the period when Japan 
annexed South Korea. This implies that the Liancourt Rocks came under the jurisdiction 
of Japan by force.   
Despite the historical documents, the San Francisco Peace Treaty implies that 
Japan never renounced Liancourt Rocks.  The ICJ will, based on prior decisions that dealt 
with territorial disputes, examine Travaus preparatoires.  The involvement of the U.S. 
and its self-interest to preserve the Liancourt Rocks under the control of allied powers 
may cause the peace treaty to not carry as much weight. 
Although the U.S. left the ambiguity of sovereignty to be decided by the ICJ, the 
U.S. perhaps does not want the case to reach the ICJ.  Perhaps at the time of drafting the 
treaty to include the Chapter VI, Article 22, which specifically mentions the ICJ to hear 
the case, the U.S. did not expect the importance of South Korea to a degree that it exerts 
today.  Once the ICJ acquires details of the peace treaty, the Liancourt Rocks dispute 
could shift from the matter of sovereignty to focusing on the role of the U.S. in drafting 
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the treaty, which could gain international spotlight as the involvement of the U.S. in 
shaping the boundary of a sovereign nation to serve the interest of the U.S. 
The Obama administration’s affirmation to stand with Japan on the Senkaku 
island dispute between Japan and China led to South Korea to wonder whether the U.S.-
Korea mutual defense treaty applies to the Liancourt Rocks.181  Unlike the Senkaku 
island dispute, where Japan is one of the U.S.’s strongest and important allies, and China 
is not, “the idea of the U.S. taking the side of either of its core allies regarding Dokdo is 
out of the question.”182  Unless South Korea or Japan fiercely take offensive action to 
claim the Liancourt Rocks, similar to the heated tension over the Senkaku Islands, the 
U.S. will remain silent and neutral. 
 South Korea views the territorial dispute with a sentiment of reclaiming what was 
lost from the Japanese colonialization.  The government of South Korea states,  
Dokdo was the first Korean territory which fell victim to the Japanese aggression.  
Now, in the view of the unreasonable and persistent claim of the Japanese 
government over Dokdo, the Korean people are seriously concerned that Japan 
might be repeating the same course of aggression.  To Korea, Dokdo is not merely 
a tiny island in the East Sea.  It is the symbol of Korean sovereignty.183 
 
The sensitive nature of the Japanese colonialization to many South Korean people adds a 
level of complexity to resolve the territorial dispute, that  
(i)t’s this historical memory that is responsible for Korea’s unwillingness to take 
this dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  From the South Korean 
perspective, losing ‘Dokdo’ would be akin to the post-facto legitimization of 
Japanese colonial rule.   On the one hand, Koreans think that as long as they have 
effective jurisdiction, there’s no point taking the risk that they may lose the 
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islands.  But more importantly, referral of the case to the ICJ appears to concede 
that Japanese claims to the islands are valid.184 
 
Given the emotional significance of the islands, South Korean lawmakers would not dare 
to propose a happy medium to resolve the dispute as it will be political suicide.  
Likewise, Japan will not back down from claiming the sovereignty, which raises the 
importance of the U.S. being the mediator to resolve the issue. 
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Should the Trump administration successfully come to an agreement with North 
Korea on denuclearization, what would be the justification to keep the THAAD system in 
South Korea?  Would the U.S. remove the THAAD system from the Seongju base since 
the main justification of the missile defense system is no longer imminent, or would the 
U.S. keep the already deployed system in place and defend its decision with different 
justifications?  The U.S. could argue to keep the system in place for the protection of the 
nuclear powerplants other valuable assets concentrated in the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula.  The limitation of this paper is largely due to the unpredictable behaviors of 
North Korea, which on the other hand allows it to shed a light on the importance of 
resolving issues remaining between South Korea and Japan in the interest of advancing 
the U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. 
The path to the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea has 
disadvantaged ordinary citizens of South Korea.  The small business owners dependent 
on Chinese tourists and companies dependent on exporting goods to China suffered 
economic hardship as well as South Korean businesses in China suffered unjust economic 
constraints.  Considering the myriad number of foreign policy think tanks and 
intelligence resources available in Washington, it would be benign to think that the U.S. 
did not expect China to respond to the THAAD deployment in South Korea.  South 
Korea was placed in the middle of the tug of war between China and the U.S. and the 
THAAD system was a good indicator for the U.S. to show China and the rest of the 
world that the U.S. is capable of exerting influence despite foreseen economic hardship.  
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The government of South Korea decided to suffer economically rather than to face 
criticism from the U.S. government.  How could the U.S. impose trade sanctions or 
disadvantage South Korean firms in the United States or limit the number of U.S. tourists 
visiting South Korea, had the government of South Korea decided not to allow the 
deployment of the THAAD system?  The U.S. could have criticized the government of 
Korea for placing its citizens in danger from possible missile attacks from North Korea, 
but from the perspective of ordinary citizens, the possible threat, which continued since 
the Korean War ended in 1953 with the Korean Armistice Agreement, is not as real as 
economic hardship.   
The Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation relieves the U.S. from being the sole 
peacekeeper in the East Asia region and allows the U.S. military to deploy resources 
strategically and hastily to where it needs to be.  Considering China’s involvement in the 
South China Sea, the U.S. could rely on the Japanese troops should a military 
engagement happens in the region.  The Japanese government will likely not bypass the 
opportunity to militarize its Self Defense Force even if it means amending the 
constitution.  However, in the context of defending South Korea from a possible attack 
from North Korea, the notion of having Japanese troops on South Korean soil is 
unimaginable given the vivid Japanese colonialization horrific memories still living in 
South Koreans.   
The THAAD deployment in South Korea and the Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation are two military strategies aimed at pressuring the Chinese government from 
achieving its military presence in the East Asia region.  The THAAD defense systems 
located to the east and west of China deter any possible missile threats from China and 
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the revised Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation allows the East Asian nation to engage in the 
East Asia regional matters, successfully sharing the peacekeeping agenda with those in 
the region and eliminating the notion of the western superpower keeping its nose in the 
matters of East Asia.  As mentioned previously, sharing the peacekeeping burden with 
Japan is a plausible strategy by the U.S., but if the defense cooperation does not limit the 
scope of how far the Self Defense Force could go, anti-Americanism could transpire in 
South Korea blaming the U.S. government for allowing the Japanese troops to set foot on 
South Korean soil.  
The “Comfort Women” issue remains unresolved despite the agreement that was 
reached in December 2015 and the incumbent South Korean President Moon repeatedly 
promised to revisit the agreement, showing that the “final and irreversible” nature of the 
December 2015 agreement is not appealing to the general public, especially the victims 
of the “Comfort Women.”  The United States is in a difficult position to engage as 
favoring one nation over the other could mean a deterioration in the well-maintained 
relationship, as it places the U.S. in the “Who do you like better, mom or dad?” situation. 
Studies on behaviors of the U.S. military in regards to establishing rules around 
how to engage in sexual activities with South Korean women near the military bases may 
place the U.S. in a discomforting position considering that ultimately, the brothels served 
a purpose to stabilize the sexual needs of the U.S. soldiers, similar to the justification 
behind creating the “Comfort Women” around the Japanese Imperial army bases.  
Perhaps this is the reason behind the silence on the issue of the “Comfort Women,” that 
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the U.S. too in fact considered South Korean women as a means to support and sustain 
the military strength during the times of uncertainty.   
Considering a handful of the “Comfort Women” victims alive, if the government 
of Korea and Japan does not reach a sought-after agreement hastily, the relationship 
between South Korea and Japan could worsen than it already is.  In the case where there 
are no longer surviving victims of the “Comfort Women,” which would nullify any 
demands made by the South Korean government to this date since there is no one for the 
government of Japan to sincerely apologies to, the government of Japan would move on 
from this issue whereas the government of South Korea could repeatedly resurface the 
issue and blame Japan for not taking the matter seriously.  This could weaken the South 
Korea-Japan relationship by placing distrust between the two nations, placing the U.S. in 
a difficult situation as a presumptive leader in the trilateral relationship. 
The “Comfort Women” issue and the territorial dispute surrounding the Liancourt 
Rocks might not have an immediate impact on the U.S’s foreign policy agendas, yet 
when considering the importance of the pivot to Asia strategy and the success of it being 
dependent on how effectively the U.S. could control the influence of China in the East 
Asia region, these issues should not be taken lightly.  The Liancourt Rocks dispute could 
be resolved relatively smoother if the U.S. could convince both governments to submit 
the dispute to the ICJ.  As the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 states, the ICJ has the 
authority to hear disputes on matters referred to in the treaty.  Based on the findings of 
the ICJ’s historic territory dispute cases, the ICJ would likely award the Liancourt Rocks 
to South Korea.  The historical documents revealing South Korea’s control of the 
Liancourt Rocks and the government of Japan’s acknowledgment of it being a part of 
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South Korea’s territory should award it to South Korea.  For the government of Japan to 
counter against the historical documents is to reject its own history.  Albeit the 
proceedings of the case would reveal how the Liancourt Rocks became a part of Japanese 
territory, which would again place the U.S. in a discomforting position since the decision 
to place the Liancourt Rocks under the Japanese territory was to be able to establish a line 
of defense closest to the Korean peninsula, the dispute should not continue for the benefit 
of the U.S.’s interest in the East Asia region.  The United States government could 
receive criticism on how a powerful nation manipulated borders of a relatively fragile 
sovereign nation in a single treaty, without that nation being present at the signing 
ceremony.  However, I would argue that the criticism on past actions does not outweigh 
the pivot to Asia agenda.  As the pivot to Asia policy from the Obama administration and 
passage of the ARIA by the Trump administration reveals the importance of containing 
the influence of China in the East Asia region.   
The ARIA mandates the incumbent administration to adhere to the agenda set 
forth in the law, which indicates that the law will live through the next administration 
taking the White House.  Considering the timeline of the pivot the Asia policy by the 
Obama administration, the significance of limiting China’s power in the East Asia region 
is an idea that lived through almost a decade long regardless of many high ranking 
political officials that were in charge over the years of making foreign policy agenda.  
Nonetheless, if South Korea and Japan continue to battle over the issue of the “Comfort 
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Women” and the Liancourt Rocks dispute, perfectly tailored U.S. foreign policies may 
not see the desired outcome. 
South Korea and Japan should come to an agreement on these issues in order to 
enhance the U.S. – South Korea – Japan trilateral relationship and only the U.S. could be 
the mediator.  As the THAAD deployment and the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 
revealed, the significance of limiting China’s influence in the East Asia region is a 
priority for U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. cannot limit China alone without the proper 
support from South Korea and Japan.  If China exerts greater influence in Asia, half of 
the world’s population is then influenced by a nation that does not agree with the political 
ideology of the U.S.  As the pivot to Asia strategy is a reaction to “surprise, mistakes, and 
inattention,”185 the U.S. cannot afford to be surprised again by the weight of the 
“Comfort Women” issues and the Liancourt Rocks dispute, cannot make the mistake of 
not actively trying to find a solution, and cannot remain inattentive as a spectator.   
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